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Abstract Climate change is now a hot political topic that blurs the boundary between
policy relevant and policy prescriptive (as contained for example in the avowed
stance of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). The growing political
relevance of climate change science necessarily places a premium on timely advice
and on risk assessment and management. What is the role of climate scientists in that
new situation?
When Climatic Change was founded in 1975 (first issue published in 1977) the
topic of climatic change was just emerging from the academic realms of paleoclimate
to one that just might have relevance to the future of civilisation. Past climatic
changes have great significance for the evolution of landforms, plant and animal
species and the eventual emergence of organized human societies. Present and
especially possible future climate change on the other hand has great significance
for future societal development. Future climatic changes will require adaptation of
human societies to cope with changing agricultural and other resources and for such
societies to cope with changing sea level and extreme events.
Further, the possibility that human actions might influence climate on a local
or global scale requires that humans consider what such influence might be, and
whether it would be desirable or not. Our understanding of climatic change thus
begins to bear directly on the desirability of various forms of human activity, and
thus to impact on policy.
The idea that human activities might affect climate followed from John Tyndall’s
demonstration in 1859 that methane and carbon dioxide control the Earth’s surface
air temperature by absorbing infra-red or heat radiation. This led Svante Arrhenius
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(1896) to suggest that increasing CO2 from industrial activity could lead to a warming
of the Earth’s climate. GS Callendar further developed this idea in 1938 (Callendar
1938), but it was not until the late 1950s that Charles Keeling of the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography put the issue firmly on the map after establishing the
first CO2 monitoring stations at Mauna Loa and the South Pole (Keeling 1960). It
was Revelle and Suess (1957) of Scripps who famously said:
Human beings are now carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment of
a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be reproduced in the
future. Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere and oceans
the concentrated organic carbon stored in sedimentary rocks over hundreds of
millions of years.
By the early 1970s, however, an observed cooling since the 1950s in the northern
hemisphere led to some concern that a prolonged cooling trend could lead to another
glaciation through the snow albedo feedback (Federal Council for Science and
Technology 1974).
Wally Broecker prophetically commented in 1975 (Broecker 1975) that:
. . . a strong case can be made that the present cooling will, within a decade
or so, give way to pronounced warming induced by carbon dioxide. Once this
happens, the exponential rise in the atmospheric carbon dioxide content will
tend to become a significant factor and by early next century will have driven
the mean planetary temperature beyond the limits experienced during the last
1000 years.
The cooling was indeed temporary, and most likely due to a rapid increase in
tropospheric aerosols due to post WWII industrialisation with sulphur-rich fossil
fuels. The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in 1976 (WMO 1976) stated
that short-term climate changes might be due to natural or man-made causes, which
they said required urgent attention and further study.
It was not until the WMO’s First World Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979
(WMO 1979) that international concern was first expressed that increasing CO2
could lead to a gradual warming of the lower atmosphere and that the world should
try to ‘foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be
adverse to the well-being of humanity’.
By the 1980s it was clear that the cooling trend had ended, and many of the
scientists who had been concerned about a cooling (including our esteemed editor
Steve Schneider) demonstrated their openness to new information by changing
their minds (see account in Chapter 1 of Schneider 2009). Continuing increases
in greenhouse gas concentrations, and a realisation that the effective lifetime of
CO2 in the atmosphere was much longer than that of particulates, making for a
greater cumulative warming effect, meant that by the early 1980s there was a growing
scientific interest in assessing the likelihood and magnitude of global warming.
Indeed, a conference of scientists at Villach in Austria in October 1985, which was
sponsored by the non-governmental International Council of Scientific Unions along
with the WMO and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) agreed to a
statement that raised the first collective scientific warning: ‘. . . it is now believed that
in the first half of the next century a rise in global mean temperature could occur
which is greater than any in human history.’ (Villach Conference 1985).
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Also in 1986, the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment
(SCOPE), a committee of the International Council of Scientific Unions, issued a
major report entitled The Greenhouse Ef fect, Climate Change and Ecosystems, which
reinforced the concern about global warming (SCOPE 1986). The SCOPE report
concluded that if the observed rate of increase of carbon dioxide continued, it would
reach double pre-industrial values towards the end of the twenty-first century, and
this would lead to global average warming in the range 1.5–5.5◦C, with associated
global average sea-level rise in the range 20–165 cm. The report went on to discuss
possible impacts on agriculture, forests and ecosystems.
By 1988 this concern had turned into a demand for action to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, adopted by over 300 scientists at a United Nations sponsored ‘Conference
on the Changing Atmosphere’ in Toronto in 1988 (Toronto 1988). This called for an
initial reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of 20% by 2005, stating that
Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive exper-
iment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear
war.
In response to these concerns, the WMO and the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
in 1988. The initial brief of the IPCC was to report to the Second World Climate
Conference in November 1990, and the United Nations General Assembly, on ‘the
scientific information that is related to the various components of the climate change
issue . . . ’ and ‘formulating realistic response strategies for the management of the
climate change issue.’
As we all know, the IPCC has indeed been busy over the last 20 years, issuing
four major scientific assessments and many other special reports (IPCC 2009). The
IPCC has organised these major assessments each into three volumes based on three
Working Groups, one on “the physical science basis” of concern, the second on
the “impacts, adaptation and vulnerability”, and the third on “mitigation of climate
change”.
The IPCC, in its instruction to authors, has been careful to emphasise that
reports should be “policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive”. This apolitical stance
recognises two things:
1. that for the conclusions to be accepted they need to eschew decision-making
about contentious policy issues, but rather set out the possibilities (including
policy options) and their possible consequences, and
2. that the conclusions should follow from the science and avoid making value-
laden choices, especially in areas outside the areas of expertise of the scientists
involved.
This is not just a matter of the reports being accepted as objective and unbiassed by
the governments to whom they are addressed, but also that they be accepted by the
general public that in democracies determines governments and their policies.
As we now know, this issue of objectivity and credibility has been exploited by
many so-called climate change ‘sceptics’ to discredit the science and any policies
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Essentially the sceptics have done this by
highlighting any objectively admitted uncertainties, distorting and exaggerating their
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significance. They have argued that uncertainty is a reason not to act, whereas in a
responsible risk management framework it may well be a reason to act.
Given the wide range of views and self-interests of member countries, a problem
area in the IPCC process is the requirement that member countries sign off on the
wording of the ‘Summaries for Policymakers’. This has led to adoption by consensus
of the country delegates, which is made easier by avoidance by the scientific authors
of any language or conclusions that might sound alarming, or which might by
logical extension into decisionmaking harm a given county’s self-perceived national
interests. This has had the effect of favouring an emphasis on mid-range projections
where there are ranges of possibilities, and an unwillingness to assign probabilities
to or make order of magnitude estimates of possible but as yet unmodelled positive
feedback effects. This tendency is made worse by many scientists unfamiliar with
policy decision-making processes and who do not take a risk management approach.
Emphasising the mid-range outcome is the lowest common denominator approach.
This is likely to apply especially to presently hard-to-quantify outcomes such as
the possible onset of serious positive feedbacks (such as large methane emissions
from melting permafrost or marine methane hydrates) or of extreme sea-level rise
projections that could arise from rapid disintegration of the Greenland or Antarctic
ice sheets.
Another major problem with the series of IPCC Assessments has been the
protracted nature of the writing and review process. This process is of course valuable
in ensuring that summaries and conclusions are in fact well-based and objective.
However, it has meant that rapidly developing topics of policy importance are often
out of date by the time of publication or shortly after.
An example is the apparent rapidity of observed climatic changes such as the
poleward extension of the Hadley Circulation and associated poleward shifts of the
mid-latitude rainfall belts. These are happening about two or three times as fast as
in the climate models, and this is vitally important for drought and flood frequencies
and water supply for many millions of people. Another example in the case of the
Fourth Assessment has been the far more rapid loss of Arctic sea ice than was
projected in the report.
Another example where lack of a timely risk management approach has led
to a failure to recognise a policy-relevant conclusion is that the climate science
community has in general focussed on possible climate changes and impacts several
decades ahead rather than on present impacts, despite a century of global warming.
This has serious policy-relevance because there is still a widely held perception
that climate change is not an immediate problem but one for future generations (if
a problem at all). While inter-generational equity makes the long-term impacts a
moral issue, that is not persuasive with many people who argue, rightly or wrongly,
that future generations will be able to cope as they will have new technology and
be wealthier. That argument does not hold up if damaging impacts are already
happening, or we are approaching some near tipping point at which damages will
rapidly increase.
The issue of possible damages now from increasingly severe or frequent extreme
events centres on the attribution of present extreme events to human-induced cli-
mate change rather than to normal climate variability. It is a difficult one because the
scientific community and IPCC have by now assigned a high likelihood to the causal
connection between the experienced global warming trend and enhanced greenhouse
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emissions, but necessarily place less confidence on attribution of individual extreme
events to climate change. The lack of risk management insight mitigates against
highlighting the experience of extremes in the present changed climate simply
because attribution is uncertain.
My argument, based on regional Australian experience, is that extreme events of
the sort to be expected from global warming are already happening more frequently
and with greater intensity than they were, and we can estimate the costs of these
changes in terms of lives lost and damages caused. My case for Australia rests on the
recent series of widespread and highly damaging wildfires in the last decade, record
heatwaves, widespread drought, and coastal impacts either already experienced or
anticipated under more stringent planning rules and higher insurance costs (with con-
sequent loss of property values). Published estimates of damages run into hundreds
of lives and billions of dollars annually.
The policy-relevant conclusion is that there is a high risk (measured as the product
of probability times consequences) that present damages due to extreme events
in Australia are in fact heightened by climate change trends. The logical policy
implication, if that ongoing risk is judged to be unacceptable, is that the situation
needs to be remedied by both adaptation to a new regime of extreme events and
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that are at the root of the problem. Where
does the scientist stop giving advice—at the causal link between cause and effect,
or at the logical policy implications which may be clear to us as scientists, but not
so clear to decisionmakers? If increased wildfire frequency and intensity is to be
expected, how does the scientific conclusion affect, for example, fire management
policies? Should we point to, and perhaps even spell that out?
I mention this as both an example of the problem of the scientific method and of
policy-relevance. I drafted a well-documented paper on the present costs of extreme
events in Australia in early October 2009 (Pittock 2009, submitted for publication),
with a view to getting it published quickly in the refereed literature so that it could
be cited in public discourse aimed at influencing the Copenhagen climate talks in
December 2009. There were three scientific report series or journals that promised
rapid publication. However, one sent it to reviewers in an early draft and the referees
queried the attribution issue. Even though I fixed that (to my satisfaction), it was by
then too late for a 2009 issue. Another rejected it as too long, while the third rejected
it because the editor judged it to be a review rather than original work. It appears,
from this admittedly limited experience, that the scientific system is not at present
geared to rapid publication of refereed and highly policy-relevant findings.
A second general problem is that research organisations that employ scientists,
be they government-funded laboratories or other bodies, are in some cases loathe
to publish policy-relevant work if it might be construed to be policy-prescriptive.
Some research organisations have policies and charters on what is appropriate, but
its application is not always clear. Individual scientists (or indeed their supervisors or
referees) can be torn between a perceived public duty to make the policy-relevance
of their findings known, and the need to avoid, as scientists, making value judgements
as to the most appropriate policy.
We all know of good scientists who have ventured into policy-advice and got
rapped over the knuckles for their trouble. But where do we draw the line?
Conventionally there is a problem with scientists in government-funded laboratories
who air views on specific policies, especially if their advice goes against government
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policy. There are real problems here regarding relevant expertise, how we deal with
uncertainties and conflicting views, and exactly where the line is drawn between
policy-relevance and policy advocacy.
I believe the answer lies at least partly in a broader acceptance of a risk-
management approach by scientists, their employers, politicians and the general
public. For example, in the case of the impacts up to now of increases in extreme
events and its relevance to climate change policy, it should be reasonable and
persuasive to point to an increased likelihood of, and the costs of, more droughts,
wildfires, heat waves and coastal impacts from the climate change and sea-level rise
experienced to date. People should be able to make their own value judgements as
to the policy implications based on some notional estimate of the probabilities, say a
50% chance that each of those extremes has been exacerbated by global warming.
More generally, the urgency of climate policy decisions militates against the best
scientific advice being brought to bear unless scientists are prepared to chance their
arms at probabilistic estimates of likely outcomes, whether it is of multi-meter sea-
level rises or of hitting some tipping point. We have, I believe, a responsibility to
make such possibilities part of the background information for decision-makers, not
to sit on our hands until we have “better quantified” estimates or gone through a
protracted refereeing process that in the case of some scientific journals can lead to
a gap of a year or more between submission and publication of a paper. Peer review
is a desirable discipline that avoids poorly based conclusions from gaining too much
credibility, but where it concerns urgent policy-relevant material the process needs
to be speeded up.
The real world does not operate on certainties: it lives with uncertainties and
makes decisions on the basis of conscious or unconscious assessments of probabil-
ities, often without waiting for expert advice. It is better that we provide timely
informed estimates than that decision-makers not expert in the areas make their own
guesses. It is a matter of responsible risk management.
And it behoves scientific journals, and employers of scientists, to recognise the
urgency of providing informed, even if uncertain, advice by speeding up publication
of urgent policy-relevant information and hanging a bit looser on the certainty. We
scientists live in the real world and have responsibilities to give the best possible
advice, even if we run the risk of the occasional error or even some bias. Like Wally
Broecker, we will be judged on our track record.
Climatic Change as a journal has moved with the times, with an increasing
emphasis on policy-related research. It has also, due to its multi-disciplinary emphasis
from the beginning discussed not just the physical science but also the potential
impacts, economics and to some extent the policy implications. This trend must
continue, especially with emphasis on the timeliness of papers in the world of
policymaking. With the typical turn-around time for full refereed papers being
around two years, the inception of Climatic Change Letters is a partial recognition
of this need. The Letters section needs to be well-used to update the science and spell
out its policy relevance, taking full account of the policy-making time-table in the real
world.
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